This paper raises the questions: 'What do we expect from nursing ethics?' and 'Is the literature of nursing ethics any different from that of medical ethics?' It is suggested that rather than develop nursing ethics as a separate field writers in nursing ethics should take a lead in making the patient the central focus of health care ethics. The case is made for empirical work in health care ethics and it is suggested that a good way of setting about this (...) is to ask practising nurses about the real ethical problems they encounter. (shrink)

These are exciting times for philosophy and psychiatry. After drifting apart for most of this century, the two disciplines, if not yet fully reconciled, are suddenly at least on speaking terms. With hindsight we may wonder why they should have ignored each other for so long. As Anthony Quinton pointed out in a lecture to the Royal Institute of Philosophy a few years ago, it is remarkable that philosophers, in a sense the experts on rationality, should have had so little (...) to say about the phenomena of irrationality. There have been partial exceptions, of course. Descartes and Kant both touched on madness; and there were, notably, important philosophical influences on the development of modern psychiatry in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Yet even John Locke, who was a doctor as well as philosopher, confined himself to a fair-l y superficial distinction between what we should now call mental illness and mental defect—those with, in Locke's view, respectively too many ideas and too few. (shrink)

In the last century and in the first decades of the present century the historians of India laid stress on the isolation of the subcontinent by the mountains and seas surrounding her on all sides and cutting her off as a separate universe. The progress of modern research has shown how mistaken this view was. We now see the true facts much more clearly than ever. The mountain barriers, though formidable at many points, are broken by gaps which have always (...) allowed a considerable intercourse across the frontiers on the northwest as well as the northeast and at some points due north as well. By her position in the center of the littoral of the Indian Ocean, India enjoyed ample facilities for communication by sea with the countries lying to her west and east, and we now know that she and her neighbors availed themselves of these facilities from time immemorial. The Indian Ocean was navigated freely from very early, even prehistoric, times, and there was a series of lively maritime exchanges—migratory, commercial, and cultural—among the peoples of Africa, India, and Indonesia, or more generally Southeast Asia. Western Asia and the lands adjoining the Levant also took, from the beginning, a prominent part in this commerce of goods and ideas between India and the world. It is the aim of this paper to trace briefly the ancient contacts between India and the Western countries to the time when the rise and spread of Islam and the Islamic impact on India ushered in a new epoch. (shrink)

Sociology, when it has come forward as a real science , has not been regarded with favor even in the West.

In this paper, I want to show, by the examination of a well-known paradox, how failure to attend to ordinary usage leads to confusion and perplexity.

The Catalogue of Palm Leaf Manuscripts kept in the Otani University Library. Otani University Library, Kyoto 1995. lxxxi, 778 pp. No price given.

This paper tries to argue that at least some alluring, trendy or fashionable problems to do with thought and language — several of which are discussed in this volume — are in fact alluring, trendy or fashionable red herrings or cul-de-sacs. I shall primarily be concerned with the ascription of thought and intelligence to non-language-users; but, en route to that, will need to brood over our ascriptions of such terms quite generally.

In generations past, it was common practice for doctors to learn lifesaving technical skills on patients who had recently died. But this practice has lately been criticised on religious, legal, and ethical grounds, and has fallen into disuse in many hospitals and emergency departments. This paper uses four questions to resolve whether doctors in emergency departments should practise and teach non-invasive and minimally invasive procedures on the newly dead: Is it ethically and legally permissible to practise and teach non-invasive and (...) minimally invasive procedures on the newly dead emergency-department patient? What are the alternatives or possible consequences of not practising non-invasive and minimally invasive procedures on newly dead patients? Is consent from relatives required? Should doctors in emergency departments allow or even encourage this use of newly dead patients? (shrink)

The increasing availability of DNA-based diagnostic tests has raised issues about whether these should be applied to the population at large in order to identify, treat or prevent a range of diseases. DNA tests raise concerns in the community for several reasons. There is the possibility of stigmatisation and discrimination between those who test positive and those who don't. High-risk individuals may be identified for whom no proven effective intervention is possible, or conversely may test "positive" for a disease that (...) does not eventuate. Controversy concerning prenatal diagnosis and termination of affected pregnancies may arise. Haemochromatosis, however, is a disease that is not only treatable but also preventable if those at high risk are identified presymptomatically. This paper will identify and discuss key issues regarding DNA-based population screening for haemochromatosis, and argue that population-based genetic screening for haemochromatosis should be supported when a number of contentious issues are addressed. In the context of a health system with limited resources haemochromatosis is the paradigm of a disorder where there is an ethical and clinical imperative to encourage presymptomatic DNA testing for all in ethnically relevant communities. (shrink)

Ḥaydar al-Harawī (d. 825/after 1427) was a significant scholar from Khorasan who migrated to the Ottoman lands. A distinguished student of al-Taftazanī, he earned high regard from Mehmed I and received patronage from him. al-Harawī dedicated his commentary on al-Zamakhsharī’s al-Kashshāf to Mehmed I with exaggerated expressions of praise and provided significant details about his biography in the introduction of the work. After spending many years in Ottoman lands, al-Harawī established contact with Shahrukh, the son of Timur. He rewrote the (...) introduction of Sharḥ al-Kashshāf and ded- icated the work to Shahrukh. This new patronage relationship is evident in the second version of the introduction, where not only the dedication part but also the content was rearranged concerning the new patron’s identity. Important biographical details not found in the first version are included in the second version, making it a crucial source for al-Harawī’s biography. This article brings the second version of the introduction to light for the first time, constructing al-Harawī’s biography by compiling information from both versions. While no specific dates are provided in either version, the duration of al-Harawi’s stay in certain cities is mentioned. Gaps in the narrative were filled based on histori- cal events, allowing for accurate dating of approximately forty years of al-Harawī’s life, from Sarakhs through Shiraz, Tabriz, Shirvan, Bursa, Edirne, and back to Khorasan. This comprehensive overview sheds light on the relationship between scholars and rulers, the influence of political developments on scholarly life, and the intellectual world of a scholar dedicated to the pursuit of knowledge. (shrink)

[About the book]: This volume is a state-of-the-art survey of the psychology of reasoning, based around, and in tribute to, one of the field's most eminent figures: Jonathan St B.T. Evans.In this collection of cutting edge research, Evans' collaborators and colleagues review a wide range of important and developing areas of inquiry. These include biases in thinking, probabilistic and causal reasoning, people's use of 'if' sentences in arguments, the dual-process theory of thought, and the nature of human rationality. These foundational (...) issues are examined from various angles and finally integrated in a concluding panoramic chapter written by Evans himself.The eighteen chapters, all written by leading international researchers, combine state-of the-art research with investigation into the most fundamental questions surrounding human mental life, such as:What is the architecture of the human mind?Are humans rational, and what is the nature of this rationality?How do we think hypothetically? The Science of Reason offer s a unique combination of breadth, depth and integrative vision, making it an indispensable resource for researchers and students of human reason. (shrink)

This study asks how Sartre’s version of the dialectic of recognition is present in Kierkegaard’s works. For Sartre, the dialectic begins with an awareness that the other sees me and judges me. I experience this as a threat to my autonomy, and I fight back with a variety of strategies designed to mitigate the effects. Inter-subjective relationships are grounded in conflict from which there is no exit. Similarly, Kierkegaard characterizes the natural, self-centered way of seeing the other as inherently self-centered (...) and contentious. And yet some of Kierkegaard’s texts lay the ground for a way out. Unlike Sartre, he is sensitive to modifications to the structure of the dialectic of recognition that depend on a change in the basic mode of looking. That is, how I see, evaluate, and judge the other can alter the foundation of the interaction from something mutually contentious to something mutually edifying. (shrink)

A Dictionary of Pali, Part I, A-Kh. Margaret Cone. Pali Text Society, Oxford 2001. xxiv, 778 pp. £25.00. ISBN 0 86013 394 X.

Index to the Dhammasangani. Compiled by Tetsuya Tabata, Satoshi Nonome and Shoko Bando. Pali Text Society, London 1987. vii, 128 pp. £8.75.

We have seen that the theory of the evolution of the universe is very remote from being matter of absolute knowledge as its popular presentation today would have us believe. Moreover, it is based on a certain aspect of reality, namely, that of science, which cannot pretend to be the only one possible and thus to exclude the religious aspect of the world as a creation by God. The same is true regarding the evolutionary theories of life by Eigen or (...) Vollmert, both being based on polymeric chemistry. If, therefore, Vollmert confesses, as already quoted, that he is not afraid to accept a creating God as an alternative to Darwinism, so in this respect he speaks despite everything as a believer and not as a scientist. By no means do I deny that the scientific results of Vollmert which seem to reveal the mystery of life to us can strengthen our faith — but never can faith be based on it. Faith springs from another source.Despite that, we can say today that the situation has changed principally, because both the philosophy of science and the discussions of the theories of evolution have shaken that kind of naive belief in science which in contrast to former times has turned theology into the ancilla, the maid of science.On the other hand, it would be a great misunderstanding to assume that now we can simply turn the tables. The criticism which I have partly put forward against the modern theories of evolution cannot obscure the numerous discoveries of the highest importance which are connected with them. These discoveries have provided us with an immensely deepened knowledge both of the physical conditions of the universe and of the chemical foundations of life. To conclude, I want to quote an American scientist who said: “I am as confused as before — but on a much higher level.” And this, I think, is the best summary of the present situation. (shrink)

Purpose: The article pursues three aims. First, it intends to differentiate between two different approaches for knowledge studies, namely an empirical and a normative mode. In a second move, two different epistemologies in the work of Ernst von Glasersfeld will be introduced under the labels of “Epistemology I” and “Epistemology II.” Epistemology I relates to empirical research, Epistemology II is normative in nature. Third, the article makes the point that while Ernst von Glasersfeld’s Epistemology II has already been presented in (...) a finite and mature form, his empirical analysis of cognitive processes still provides a rich pool of tools and designs that should be further developed and advanced in the years and decades ahead. Method: The article is analytical in nature, identifying the different building blocks and relational networks of von Glasersfeld’s two epistemologies. By this, the article intends to contribute to a further advancement of von Glasersfeld’s Epistemology I. Results: The main finding lies in recognizing the radical and innovative elements of von Glasersfeld’s Epistemology I and on the still-challenging research designs of Epistemology I. (shrink)